TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/012191/0121018.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 8.8 KB | 194 lines

                                                                                THE GULF, Page 40

Can Sanctions Still Do The Job?


Given time, the embargo would cripple Iraq, but that does not
mean Saddam would pull out of Kuwait

By BRUCE W. NELAN -- Reported by William Mader/London and J.F.O.
McAllister/Washington


    One of the draft resolutions Congress considered but did not
pass last week called on President Bush to postpone military
action against Iraq and give sanctions time to work. That is
the approach most senior Democrats on Capitol Hill favor, along
with a significant portion of the U.S. public and some of the
other 27 countries arrayed against Saddam Hussein in the gulf.
Said Senate majority leader George Mitchell: "I don't think we
should go to war. I believe that the correct policy is to
continue the economic sanctions."

    The U.N. Security Council last Aug. 6 ordered all member
states to cut off trade and financial dealings with Iraq. Only
nine days later, George Bush said in a speech at the Pentagon,
"Sanctions are working." But last month Secretary of State
James Baker was telling the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
"They haven't worked." Behind this seeming flip-flop were
differing interpretations of what it means for sanctions to
work.

    In one sense -- the ability to damage Iraq's economy -- the
embargo and blockade are undeniably working. Iraq is especially
vulnerable to sanctions; its foreign-exchange earnings depend
almost entirely -- some 95% -- on oil exports, and shipments
have been shut off, depriving Baghdad of more than $1.5 billion
in sales every month. Its imports of food and industrial goods
have also been squeezed to less than 10% of the quantities Iraq
consumed before its invasion of Kuwait last August.

    Historically, economic pressures have failed more often than
they have succeeded. Usually they were too narrow, like those
imposed by the U.S. on Poland after martial law was declared
in 1981, or poorly policed, like the U.N. oil and arms embargo
directed at South Africa. But the sanctions against Iraq are
more potent than any since World War II, says Gary Hufbauer,
a professor of international finance at Georgetown University.
Everything moving in and out of the country is affected, and
much of the world is participating. Observes Hufbauer: "This
is isolation of magnificent proportions."

    The most authoritative Administration evaluation of the
effects so far has come from CIA Director William Webster, who
predicts that Iraq's military effectiveness will begin to
decline between July and the end of the year as spare parts are
exhausted. Iraq, he said, should run out of foreign-currency
reserves by spring, "leaving it little cash with which to
entice potential sanctions busters" to run the blockade.

    Patrick Clawson, a resident scholar at the Foreign Policy
Research Institute in Philadelphia, is convinced that the
Iraqis "will be in desperate straits by the end of 1991." There
is general agreement among civilian experts that the sanctions
will inflict severe damage in one to two years. But Clawson
adds, "We're seeing a slow deterioration, not a collapse."

    This is where the ambiguous word working takes on another
meaning. The U.S. and its coalition are not seeking simply to
punish Iraq by destroying its economy. They have pledged to
force Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. It is impossible for
anyone on either side of the debate to prove that slow
deterioration, no matter how prolonged, will accomplish that
objective. As the U.S. learned recently in its dealings with
Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega, even wide-ranging sanctions
may not coerce a conscienceless dictator.

    By increasing food production, tightening rations,
cannibalizing spare parts, shifting factory production to
high-priority items and producing domestic substitutes for
certain imports, Saddam is extending his ability to wage war.
After an eight-year battle with Iran, Iraqis are accustomed to
shortages and improvisation. "They can take a lot of economic
punishment yet," says Michael Dewar, deputy director of
London's International Institute for Strategic Studies. Saddam
has already announced that his armed forces have first claim
on resources.

    At his congressional testimony last month, Webster added
that in spite of the damage sanctions were doing, there was no
guarantee that they would be sufficient to drive Saddam out of
Kuwait. In the midst of last week's debate, he repeated his
assessment in a letter to House Armed Services Committee
chairman Les Aspin.

    "Even if sanctions continue to be enforced for an additional
six to 12 months," the CIA director wrote, "economic hardship
alone is unlikely to compel Saddam to retreat from Kuwait or
cause regime-threatening popular discontent in Iraq." An
additional six to 12 months of sanctions, Webster added, would
"diminish" the defensive strength of Iraq's air force and
produce a "marginal decline of combat power" in its armor and
artillery. But the ability of Iraqi ground forces to defend
Kuwait "is unlikely to be substantially eroded."

    Time, or the lack of it, is the key factor in the White
House's new evaluation of sanctions. If it were not, a
sustained blockade would eventually significantly weaken the
Iraqi military and possibly even touch off a coup against
Saddam. But the U.S. must worry about the steadfastness of its
allies. France is already breaking ranks with Washington in its
effort to put together a deal that might tempt Saddam. Moscow's
support is open to question now that Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze has announced his resignation and the military
high command, where many have long been partial to Iraq, is
regaining clout. Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria are nervous
about keeping so many U.S. troops in the region indefinitely.
The entire coalition could come unglued if the sitzkrieg
continues much longer.

    Other problems add to the time pressure. Kuwait is being
looted and terrorized; its existence as a nation is in danger.
Saddam is fortifying the conquered territory with concrete
bunkers and fire trenches, and improving his chemical and
biological weapons. Even if there is no war, the deployment of
American forces in the gulf is expected to cost $30 billion
this year, and every country in the world that imports oil is
paying a higher price for it. Even the best of troops cannot
be kept on prolonged alert in such inhospitable terrain without
losing their combat readiness.

    If the decision is made, in spite of these considerations,
to wait and see what sanctions could do, the next step would
have to be rotation of U.S. troops out of the region. Their
numbers would have to be cut to just enough to deter an Iraqi
attack on Saudi Arabia. That kind of pullout would give Saddam
a propaganda windfall by enabling him to claim a great victory
over the foreign invaders. Once again, he could say, the
Americans lacked staying power. After a year or two, even if
Iraq's military strength has deteriorated badly, Washington
could find it politically difficult to mount either a
multinational or a unilateral attack on Iraq.

    Sanctions were imposed last August because they could be put
in place quickly and were a necessary first step in responding
to Saddam's aggression. Bush pledged from the beginning that
the occupation of Kuwait "will not stand," and repeatedly
refused to exclude any options, including military force.

    But Bush's initial rhetorical enthusiasm for sanctions and
his engineering of a burst of U.N. resolutions convinced many
people in the U.S. and elsewhere that he thought economic
pressure, combined with the threat of force, could do the job.
They were understandably startled when he almost doubled the
size of the U.S. force in the gulf last November. But that
military momentum and the Security Council's deadline of Jan.
15 for an Iraqi retreat probably make any further discussion of
the utility of sanctions academic. Time has just about run out.


____________________________________________________________
TAKING INVENTORY


    On Jan. 15 the sanctions will have been in place for five
months and nine days.

    Here is a status report:

    -- Iraq will run out of foreign-currency reserves by spring.

    -- The embargo has cost Iraq 50% of its GNP.

    -- Bread, sugar and soap are rationed.

    -- Imports of industrial goods, raw materials, semifinished
goods and machinery have been reduced by more than 90%.

    -- Scarcity of tires, spare parts and lubricants is idling
buses, cars and taxis.

    -- On average, per capita food consumption in Iraq is
estimated at 1,800 calories a day, down from 3,100 before
sanctions.

    -- The country's military effectiveness will begin to
decline in six to twelve months.